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Media Frames and Cognitive
Accessibility: What Do “Global
Warming” and “Climate Change”
Evoke in Partisan Minds?
Jonathon P. Schuldt & Sungjong Roh
Decades of research demonstrate that how the public thinks about a given issue is
affected by how it is framed by the media. Typically, studies of framing vary how an
issue is portrayed (often, by altering the text of written communication) and compare
subsequent beliefs, attitudes, or preferences—taking a framing effect as evidence that a
media frame (or frame in communication) instantiated a particular audience frame
(or frame in thought). Less work, however, has attempted to measure frames in thought
directly, which may illuminate cognitive mechanisms that underlie framing effects. In
this vein, we describe a Web experiment (n = 400) in which US political partisans
reported the extent to which a “global warming” or “climate change” frame brought to
mind various climate-related concepts. Although the media frequently employ them
interchangeably, these frames evoked distinct patterns of cognitive accessibility across
partisans: Whereas conservatives associated heat-related impacts (rising temperatures,
melting ice) more strongly with “global warming” than with “climate change,” liberals
associated these impacts equally with both phrases. Discussion focuses on implications
for media framing of climate issues and framing theory more broadly.
Keywords: framing effects; climate change; cognitive accessibility; media frames;
motivated reasoning
“Global warming” and “climate change” succinctly describe a complicated
phenomenon, and in just a few decades they have become common descriptors.
—B. Palmer in The Washington Post (2012)
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Numerous studies in communication and related fields (including political science,
psychology, and sociology) reveal that changes to the way an issue is framed—often,
seemingly trivial ones—can powerfully affect how audiences perceive the issue. Many
framing studies proceed as follows. Researchers identify two or more frames, which
“select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a
communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition,
causal interpretation, and/or treatment recommendation for the problem described”
(Entman, 1993, p. 52). Members of some target audience are then exposed to one
frame or another based on random assignment, before the outcome of interest—
typically, a measure of policy preference (e.g., support or oppose)—is compared
across treatments. When aggregate preference levels are found to differ across frames,
a framing effect is said to have occurred (Druckman, 2001a; Nelson, Oxley, &
Clawson, 1997).
This general characterization of frames and their effects obscures significant
conceptual ambiguity regarding what constitutes a frame and how they exert their
influence, a topic that has received a fair amount of attention from communication
and public opinion scholars (Druckman, 2001a, 2010; Entman, 1993; Scheufele,
1999). In the present work, we seek to contribute to this ongoing discussion by
attempting to directly measure the cognitive concepts evoked by two media frames
that are commonly employed in environmental communication, namely “global
warming” and “climate change,” and by doing so in a political context where climate
issues are currently highly politicized (namely, the USA). This work also reiterates the
value of distinguishing the related concepts of media frames, audience frames, and
framing effects, with a special focus on illuminating audience frames—or “frames of
thought”—that may affect subsequent judgments of political import (Chong &
Druckman, 2007; Scheufele, 1999).
Frames and Their Conceptual Ambiguities
One place in which this ambiguity is apparent is in the two types of frames that
scholars commonly examine, which Druckman (2001b) has distinguished as
equivalency frames (more commonly studied in psychology and behavioral decision
research) and emphasis frames (more commonly studied in communication and
political science). Equivalency frames use different words but convey information that
is logically equivalent (e.g., “90% fat-free” vs. “10% fat”; Teigen & Karevold, 2005),
whereas emphasis frames use different words that selectively appeal to select
knowledge structures stored in memory (e.g., stereotypes and other schemata) and
thereby promote particular ways of interpreting an issue over others (e.g.,
immigration as a “humanitarian” vs. “national security” issue). Perhaps the best-
known example of equivalency framing is the classic Asian disease problem studied
by Tversky and Kahneman (1981), who found a dramatic shift toward riskier
preferences when the logically equivalent outcomes of alternative disease-prevention
programs were framed in terms of lives lost as opposed to lives saved. An example of
emphasis framing comes from work by Iyengar (1990) on the framing of poverty in
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the news as thematic (focused on macro-societal factors) versus episodic (focused on
the plight of an individual), which revealed greater personal attributions of
responsibility under the latter frame.
Further conceptual ambiguity lies in theoretical models of how frames operate. For
instance, models of framing effects distinguish between media frames (or frames in
communication) and audience frames (or frames in thought; Chong & Druckman,
2007; Scheufele, 1999). Unlike media frames, which are properties of a message that
journalists are bound to employ in order to provide context and promote audience
understanding of news, audience frames exist in the minds of message recipients, and
are typically characterized as packages of stored knowledge, or schemata, that become
temporarily accessible and help to organize experience and facilitate information
processing (Entman, 1993; Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Goffman, 1974; Higgins, 1996).
However, in most studies examining the influence of media frames on audience frames
(see Scheufele, 1999, for a typology of framing studies), audience frames as they are
commonly conceptualized—that is, as highly accessible cognitive structures that guide
an individual’s interpretation of information (Chong & Druckman, 2007)—are not
measured directly. Instead, researchers typically measure a particular outcome variable
of interest (often, some attitude, preference, or belief) and take any observed difference
as evidence that the media frames did indeed instantiate distinct audience frames.
While inferring the instantiation of distinct audience frames in this manner is
unlikely to prove controversial, measuring outcomes rather than the cognitive
processes by which they are presumably mediated nevertheless poses a significant
theoretical challenge—namely, a tendency to define the (unobserved) audience frame
on the basis of the (observed) media frame. For instance, when gain versus loss
framing leads to different preference outcomes (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981), we tend
to speak about the effects of a gain versus loss “frame of mind” (e.g., Gunderman,
2009, p. 562). This tendency presumes that the method by which the independent
variable was operationalized (gain vs. loss language) activates cognitions of a parallel
nature (gain vs. loss thoughts), thereby obscuring the possibility that other accessible
cognitions may account for, or mediate, the observed effect. That is, without directly
measuring the audience’s cognitive response to different media frames, we are left to
speculate about which concepts and schemata are rendered accessible and whether
they might vary across audience members as a function of relevant individual
difference variables (e.g. political orientation, sex, income, etc.).
Although much of the experimental research on framing effects omits direct
measures of cognitive accessibility, some work has attempted to directly capture the
thoughts that media frames evoke among audiences. For instance, Price, Tewksbury,
and Powers (1997) exposed undergraduates to different versions of a news article that
contained the same core information about (fictional) state budget cuts to higher
education but that framed the issue in terms of human interest, conflict, or
consequence considerations, depending on condition. Immediately after reading the
story, the researchers assessed cognitive accessibility by having the students complete
a free-writing exercise, which was then coded for mentions of relevant thoughts.
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Results showed that, relative to a control condition, the three experimental conditions
tended to heighten the accessibility of frame-specific themes (e.g. tuition increases
under the consequence frame) and suppress those made accessible by the control
(core story) version (e.g. reduction of the state budget). Moreover, in a follow-up
experiment, the researchers assessed the influence of these frames on students’
support for a policy initiative to limit tuition increases and found effects that
generally complemented the differences in cognitive accessibility observed in the
earlier study (e.g. greater support for capping tuition increases in the consequences
condition than in the control condition).
In related work, Valkenburg, Semetko, and De Vreese (1999) presented the same
core news stories about crime in the Netherlands and the introduction of the euro
currency to an audience of undergraduates at the University of Amsterdam.
Depending on condition, the stories contained additional information that framed
the issues in terms of different social themes (specifically, in terms of conflict, human
interest, governmental responsibility, or economic consequences; an additional
control condition contained no frame information). As in the study by Price and
colleagues, participants then completed an open-ended thought-listing task, and their
responses again tended to reflect the salient themes portrayed in the specific story
versions they read (e.g. more mentions related to conflict in the conflict-frame
condition). Thus, it appears that—at least in uncontested, or non-competitive, media
environments (see Chong & Druckman, 2007, for a discussion of competitive
framing)—the frames employed by the media in their coverage of various issues are
likely to evoke a set of largely frame-consistent cognitions among the audience. This
observation is consistent with decades of research in communication and psychology
demonstrating the disproportionate influence of temporarily accessible or salient
information on cognitive processing (e.g. Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996; Higgins,
Rholes, & Jones, 1977; McCombs & Shaw, 1972; Schwarz, 1999).
Although the present work similarly seeks to directly measure cognitive responses
to different media frames, it differs from these previous efforts in important ways.
First, instead of embedding frames within news articles as these and other studies
have done (see also Iyengar, 1990), we solicit participants’ responses to just the core
media frame itself—“global warming” or “climate change”—stripped of any other
contextual information that longer news articles provide. Thus, we make the
assumption that our participants have been previously exposed to real-life news
stories employing each of these frames, and rather than seeking to assess how
embedding these frames in any one story affects which thoughts come to mind, we
are more interested in the thoughts evoked by these media frames in general.1
Second, rather than being primarily interested in testing for uniform effects of media
frames on cognitive accessibility across audience members, we are primarily
interested in testing whether these frames activate different cognitions as a function
of individuals’ frame-relevant values (namely, political orientation), for reasons we
outline later. Third, instead of soliciting cognitive responses with open-ended
thought-listing measures, we use closed-ended rating scales that allow us to target
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specific cognitive associations of interest that are informed by previous work (see
below). Finally, because the audience for news stories about global climate change is
broad, we sought a sample of US adults that was more diverse than university
undergraduates, with the hope that our findings would better generalize to how the
US public at large thinks about these common media frames.
Media Frames and Global Climate Change
How is global climate change framed in the news media and everyday discourse and to
what effect? Recent work in environmental communication reveals different
approaches to this important question. Analogous to the approach taken by scholars
studying the framing of other issues (e.g. crime in the Netherlands; Valkenburg et al.,
1999), one approach considers how linking global climate change to broad
sociocultural themes that matter to many members of the public, and to some
audience segments in particular, might affect public support for climate mitigation
policies. In this vein, Nisbet (2009) discusses how actors on different sides of the
climate debate have framed the issue in ways that reinforce their preexisting ideologies
and contribute to the partisan divide—dynamics that may be especially pronounced in
the USA, where recent survey data find that while two-thirds of Americans agree that
there is solid evidence that the “average temperature on earth has been getting
warmer,” belief is substantially higher among liberal Democrats (91%) than among
conservative Republicans (43%) (Pew Research Center for the People and the Press
[Pew], 2012). For instance, whereas liberals might tend to employ a “scientific
certainty,” “green jobs,” or “economic development” frame when communicating
about climate issues, conservatives might employ a “scientific uncertainty” or
(negative) “economic consequences” frame (Nisbet, 2010). In related work, Maibach,
Nisbet, Baldwin, Akerlof, and Diao (2010) have explored how reframing global climate
change as a public health issue may increase audience concern and promote greater
climate engagement (see also Asplund, Hjerpe, & Wibeck, 2013; Billett, 2010).
A second approach, and our focus here, examines the effect of “global warming”
versus “climate change” framing on how the public thinks about global climate
change. As mentioned above, these phrases commonly appear in media coverage of
climate issues, where—despite their different technical meanings2—they are some-
times treated as synonymous. For instance, take the following headline from a 2010
piece in The New York Times covering the results of newly released polling data: “Big
Partisan Gap on Climate Change Is Widened by Tea Partiers” (Marshall, 2010).
However, the actual survey questions, fielded by the Pew Research Center, made no
mention of “climate change” and instead solicited opinions about “global warming,”
as reflected in Pew’s press release on the findings: “Wide Partisan Divide Over Global
Warming” (Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, 2010; emphasis
added). Although the difference between these headlines may seem subtle, the fact
that they employ different phrases may not be trivial from a framing perspective, as
“global warming” and “climate change” may function in a manner similar to that of
other emphasis frames (Druckman, 2001b), by activating different cognitions,
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drawing the audience’s attention to different aspects of the issue at hand, and
ultimately affecting downstream policy-related preferences.
Suggesting that these phrases may indeed evoke different cognitions and affect
politically meaningful judgments, a national survey experiment featuring US
respondents revealed significantly lower levels of existence belief when the issue
was framed in terms of “global warming” as opposed to “climate change” (Schuldt,
Konrath, & Schwarz, 2011). Specifically, respondents were asked the following
question (alternative wording in parentheses; formating original):
You may have heard about the idea that the world’s temperature may have been
going up (changing) over the past 100 years, a phenomenon sometimes called
“global warming” (“climate change”). What is your personal opinion regarding
whether or not this has been happening? [Definitely has not been happening;
Probably has not been happening; Unsure, but leaning toward it has not been
happening; Not sure either way; Unsure, but leaning toward it has been happening;
Probably has been happening; Definitely has been happening]
Importantly, political partisanship figured prominently in this framing effect: Whereas
significantly fewer Republicans reported believing that the issue was real under the
“global warming” than the “climate change” frame (44.0% vs. 60.2%), equal numbers
of Democrats reported believing regardless of the frame employed (86.9% vs. 86.4%).3
Analogous findings were found for political orientation, with conservatives (but not
liberals) reporting less belief in “global warming” than in “climate change.”
Cognitive Responses to “Global Warming” versus “Climate Change”
Although past survey findings suggest that “global warming” and “climate change”
may render different cognitive associations accessible in the minds of the public—and
among Republicans and conservatives in particular—which associations, exactly,
remain unknown, given that respondents’ more immediate cognitive responses (i.e.,
audience frames) were not assessed. Nevertheless, previous work suggests some
possibilities. In a nationally representative survey, Leiserowitz (2006) asked US
respondents to report the images that came to mind when they thought about “global
warming.” Out of 24 image categories with distinct themes, the two most commonly
associated images were related to melting polar ice and temperature increases, with
34% of the public mentioning a response that could be coded into one of these
categories. Especially relevant to the present research, Whitmarsh (2009) asked
residents in the south of England to report on the concepts that came to mind when
they thought about either “global warming” or “climate change.” Consistent with
Leiserowitz (2006), strong temperature-related themes emerged when the respon-
dents were asked about global warming (30.1% and 25.3% alluded to temperature
increase and melting icebergs/glaciers, respectively), themes that were less prominent
when respondents were instead asked about climate change (where 16.2% and 13.7%
alluded to these themes). In addition, whereas respondents were more likely to
mention anthropogenic causes when asked about global warming (e.g., 15.1% and
11.5% mentioned fossil fuel burning and car exhaust, respectively), these themes
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emerged less often when respondents were instead asked about climate change
(mentioned by just 6.5% in each case; see Lakoff, 2010, for a discussion of the natural
connotations of “climate change”).
Different Cognitive Responses across US Political Partisans
While the results from Whitmarsh (2009) provide direct evidence that “global
warming” and “climate change” may indeed engender distinct cognitive responses, it
is unclear whether those data, which were collected in the UK, will generalize to the
USA, where the climate issue has long been highly partisan. As mentioned above, US
public opinion data reveal consistently lower existence beliefs and less concern about
climate issues among Republicans and conservatives than among Democrats and
liberals. As Krosnick, Holbrook, and Visser (2000) discuss, the roots of this political
divide can be traced to the mid-1990s, beginning with a benchmark report by the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) indicating that human activities
were likely responsible for the phenomenon and a subsequent campaign by the
Clinton White House to build public support for the signing the Kyoto Protocol. In
the years that followed, public relations battles have been fought between partisans on
both sides of the debate in an effort to influence climate discourse and policy
outcomes (McCright & Dunlap, 2000; Oreskes & Conway, 2010). This ideological
divide has proven persistent even as climate science has become more certain
(Oreskes, 2004), as illustrated by a recent analysis covering a decade of Gallup polling
data (2001–2010) showing that liberals and Democrats reliably reported greater belief
and concern about global climate change than did conservatives and Republicans
(McCright & Dunlap, 2011).
In light of this ongoing partisan divide, Republicans and conservatives may be
somewhat more likely to question the existence of global climate change when readily
available information facilitates doing so, and the heightened accessibility of
temperature increases or human causality may qualify. Taking temperature increases
first, some heat-related images such as melting icebergs/glaciers may lower the public’s
concern and reduce the likelihood of engaging in climate-mitigating action (e.g.,
lowering the thermostat in winter, carpooling) because they are psychologically
distant (Gilbert, 2006; Trope & Liberman, 2010; Weber, 2006). Moreover, the heat-
related concepts evoked by “global warming” may sometimes appear to contradict
one’s personal experience with the weather (say, when unusually cold temperatures
prevail) and thereby encourage existence doubts and less concern about the issue,
consistent with a documented tendency to confuse weather with climate (Bostrom,
Morgan, Fischhoff, & Read, 1994; Read, Bostrom, Morgan, Fischhoff, & Smuts, 1994;
Weber & Stern, 2011). Such a pattern would be consistent with observations of
conservative media’s use of the “global warming” frame to cast doubt on climate
science during unusually cold weather events (e.g., Beck, 2011; Drudge, 2004) and
with the tendency for conservative (but not liberal) think tanks in the USA to
emphasize “global warming” over “climate change” in their communications (Schuldt
et al., 2011). Second, Republicans may especially resist the suggestion that humans are
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responsible for global climate change (McCright & Dunlap, 2000), and as a result,
may report lower existence beliefs when anthropogenic associations such as fossil fuel
burning are brought to mind. Thus, if the “global warming” frame were to heighten
the accessibility of thoughts related to temperature increases and/or human causality
among conservatives and Republicans in particular, it may have downstream
consequences for a host of climate-related judgments, including less belief that the
phenomenon really exists, lower levels of climate-related concern, and less support
for climate mitigation policies, to name a few. In other words, such a pattern would
suggest that effects of these different media frames (e.g., “global warming” vs. “climate
change”) on politically meaningful outcome variables might not be direct, but instead
mediated by the distinct audience frames (e.g., heat and/or anthropogenic associa-
tions) that these phrases evoke in the minds of the public.
The Present Work
Building on past research into the cognitive knowledge made accessible by “global
warming” and “climate change” (Leiserowitz, 2006; Whitmarsh, 2009) and in the
tradition of research that directly measures the audience’s immediate cognitive
response to alternative media frames (Price et al., 1997; Valkenburg et al., 1999), the
present work explores whether these two common climate frames activate distinct
associations among audiences in the USA, where global climate change is highly
politicized. In particular, we sought to address the following research ques-
tions (RQs):
RQ1: Do members of the U.S. public, in general, associate specific climate-related
causes and consequences (i.e., heat-related impacts and human causes) more
strongly with “global warming” than with “climate change”?
RQ2: Do U.S. conservatives and Republicans, in particular, associate specific
climate-related causes and consequences (i.e., heat-related impacts and human
causes) more strongly with “global warming” than with “climate change”?
Web Experiment
Participants
To explore whether “global warming” and “climate change” activate distinct cognitive
associations among members of the US public, and conservatives/Republicans in
particular, we recruited 400 US participants via Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk
crowdsourcing work site between June and August of 2012 to participate in a Web-
based experiment in exchange for a nominal fee ($0.25) (for discussion and validation
of this data source, see Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz, 2012; Paolacci, Chandler, &
Ipeirotis, 2010). As a part of a longer session ostensibly about recognition and
memory ability, participants were asked to report on the extent to which they
associated various concepts with “global warming” (n = 196) or “climate change”
(n = 204) depending on their randomly experimental condition. Participants’ mean
age was 29.8 years (SD = 11.0 years), 55% (i.e., 220) were male, 97.3% reported
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holding US citizenship, and most (86.4%) reported at least some college/university
education (42.1% held a college/university degree). On average, the sample leaned
liberal (M = 3.00, SD = 1.56, on a scale from 1 = very liberal to 7 = very conservative)
and the modal party identification (46.8%) was “Democrat.”4
Cognitive Accessibility Measures
We measured the accessibility of six different concepts related to the causes and
consequences of global climate change—namely, rising temperatures, melting polar
ice, pollution, natural variation, immediate impacts, and delayed impacts—which
correspond to three of the dimensions previously explored by Whitmarsh (2009)
(namely, temperature-related impacts, human vs. natural causation, and present vs.
future impacts). Again, we were particularly interested in the first two of these
dimensions—temperature-related impacts and human vs. natural causation—given
that “global warming” was previously found to be more readily associated with
temperature increases and human causes than was “climate change” (the present vs.
future impact items were included for exploratory purposes).
Participants were asked, “When you think about the term ‘global warming’
[‘climate change’], to what extent does each of the following come to mind? (1 = Not
at all to 7 = Very much)” (alternative wording in brackets). The six association ratings
were vertically arrayed on the computer screen and presented in a random order for
each participant. After the ratings, participants reported on demographic variables
(e.g., age, gender, and educational attainment), including political orientation (1 =
very liberal to 7 = very conservative), political affiliation (as Democrat, Republican,
Independent, or Other/None of the above), and a single-item measure assessing
general environmental concern, “Generally speaking, how concerned are you about
the state of the natural environment? (1 = Not at all concerned to 7 = Very
concerned).” On average, the questionnaire took approximately three to five minutes
to complete.
Results
To examine whether the “global warming” and “climate change” frames evoke
distinct cognitive associations among the public in general and/or among conserva-
tives and Republicans in particular, we conducted a series of multiple regression
analyses. In each, one of the six association items (e.g., rising temperatures) was
regressed onto frame condition (climate change vs. global warming; coded −0.5 and
+0.5, respectively), political ideology (1 = very liberal to 7 = very conservative; mean-
centered), and their interaction term. Results revealed significant interactions between
frame and political ideology only for the two temperature-related items, rising
temperatures (b = .22, t(396) = 3.48, p = .001) and melting polar ice (b = .22, t(396) =
2.82, p = .005; Table 1). We then diagnosed the nature of these interactions using
regression procedures outlined by Aiken and West (1991).
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Table 1 OLS regression testing media frame and political ideology as predictors of six impact associations.
Rising temperatures Melting polar ice Pollution
Natural
variation
Immediate
impacts Delayed impacts
Predictors b(SE) T b(SE) T b(SE) t b(SE) t b(SE) t b(SE) t
Media frame .35 (.09) 3.60** .16 (.12) 1.35 .04 (.14) .30 .19 (.16) 1.18 −.17 (.16) −1.02 .33 (.17) 1.96†
Political ideology −.14 (.03) −4.25** −.16 (.04) −4.14** −.24 (.05) −5.31** .22 (.05) 4.17** −.14 (.05) −2.7* −.23 (.06) −4.23**
Media frame × Political
ideology
.22 (.06) 3.48** .22 (.08) 2.82* .10 (.09) 1.10 .11 (.11) .10 .14 (.11) 1.35 .11 (.11) .99
% explained R2 10.5 6.9 6.5 4.6 2.7 5.7
Note: Media frame was coded as: −0.5 = climate change; +0.5 = global warming.
†p < .10; *p < .01; **p < .001.
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Taking rising temperatures first, these analyses revealed that whereas liberal
participants (operationalized as M – 1SD on political ideology) associated this impact
equally with the global warming and climate change frames (Mglobal warming = 6.33 vs.
Mclimate change = 6.32; b = .01, t < 1, ns), conservative participants (operationalized as
M + 1SD on political ideology) associated this impact significantly more with the
global warming frame (Mglobal warming = 6.26 vs. Mclimate change = 5.56; b = .70, t(396) =
5.00, p < .001; Figure 1). Complementing this spotlight analysis, simple slopes
analysis revealed that whereas global warming’s associations of rising temperatures
did not vary across partisans (b = −.03, ns), climate change’s associations of rising
temperatures decreased with increasing conservatism (b = −.25, p < .001). The
analysis for melting polar ice revealed a highly similar pattern. Whereas liberal
participants (M – 1SD) again associated this impact equally with the global warming
and climate change frames (Mglobal warming = 6.08 vs. Mclimate change = 6.26; b = −.18,
∣t∣(396) = 1.05, ns), conservative participants (M + 1SD) associated this impact more
strongly with the global warming frame (Mglobal warming = 5.92 vs.Mclimate change = 5.43;
b = .49, t(396) = 2.95, p < .01).
Regression results also revealed a marginally significant main effect of frame on
associations of delayed impacts, with “global warming” evoking these thoughts more
strongly than “climate change”; however, in contrast to rising temperatures and
melting polar ice, these associations did not differ across partisans (Table 1). Although
we did not expect this difference to emerge, this pattern may reflect a general
tendency for the public to perceive the consequences of “global warming” as
psychologically distant, not only spatially but temporally as well (Gilbert, 2006;
Leiserowitz, 2006; Weber, 2006). Perhaps unsurprisingly, political ideology signifi-
cantly predicted all six associations, such that increased conservatism negatively
predicted associations of rising temperatures, melting polar ice, pollution, immediate
impacts, and delayed impacts, but positively predicted associations of natural
variation. This pattern echoes the familiar observation that conservatives in the
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Figure 1. Graphs depicting the interaction of media frame and political ideology for
associations of rising temperatures (left) and melting polar ice (right).
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USA are less concerned about the phenomenon’s consequences and more likely to
attribute it to natural causes (McCright & Dunlap, 2011).
We also tested whether these associations were related to the other demographic
variables in our data set (age, gender, environmental concern, and educational
attainment). Overall, age positively predicted associations of melting ice (b = .02,
t(396) = 2.63, p < .01), and females reported higher associations of rising
temperatures, melting polar ice, and immediate impacts (bs > .27, ts > 2.37, ps <
.05), and lower associations of delayed impacts (b = −.38, ∣t∣(396) = 2.21, p = .03).
Also unsurprisingly, environmental concern predicted heightened accessibility for
nearly every item, except natural variation (bs > .21, ts > 3.78, ps < .001). Educational
attainment did not significantly predict any of the six associations. Finally, among
these demographic variables, only one significant interaction was observed: Whereas
participants low in environmental concern (M – 1SD) tended to associate pollution
more with “global warming” than with “climate change” (Mglobal warming = 5.02 vs.
Mclimate change = 4.76; t(396) = 1.40, p = .16), participants high in environmental
concern (M + 1SD) associated pollution significantly more with “climate change”
(Mglobal warming = 5.96 vs. Mclimate change = 6.34; t(396) = 2.05, p = .04) (b = .24, t(396)
= 2.43, p = .02, for the interaction).
Corresponding analyses featuring political party affiliation (Republican, Demo-
crat, Independent, Other/None of the above) complemented the above regression
results featuring political ideology. Speaking to RQ1, mean accessibility ratings for
“global warming” were significantly higher than “climate change” for rising
temperatures (Mglobal warming = 6.29 vs. Mclimate change = 5.94; t(398) = 3.48,
p = .001) and marginally higher for delayed impacts (Mglobal warming = 4.90 vs.
Mclimate change = 4.56; t(398) = 1.93, p = .054; Table 2). Speaking to RQ2, which
focuses on the interaction effect of media frame and political orientation, we next
tested whether these effects varied by political affiliation by including the frame by
affiliation interaction term in the models. Post-hoc contrasts with Bonferroni
corrections revealed only one significant effect: Republicans associated rising
temperatures more strongly with the global warming frame than with the climate
change frame (Mglobal warming = 6.48 vs. Mclimate change = 5.52; 95% CI: 1.89 to .02,
p = .04).
Discussion
Which cognitions become activated when an audience is exposed to a given media
frame? This fundamental question has received surprisingly little direct attention in
the framing literature, where scholars typically measure the influence of alternative
media frames on more general outcome variables, such as political beliefs or policy
preferences. By attempting to directly measure the audience’s cognitive response—or
frames of mind (Scheufele, 1999)—scholars may shed light on how alternative frames
interact with audience characteristics in eliciting cognitive responses and gain insight
into the psychological mechanisms that mediate known framing effects (Price
et al., 1997).
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Table 2 Mean association ratings by media frame and party identification.
Party identification
Overall Republicans Democrats Independents Others
Impact CC GW CC GW CC GW CC GW CC GW
Rising temperatures 5.94** (1.07) 6.29** (.97) 5.52* (1.08) 6.48* (.59) 6.16 (.85) 6.29 (1.07) 5.85 (1.33) 6.21 (.93) 5.64 (1.03) 6.35 (1.00)
Melting polar ice 5.84 (1.26) 6.01 (1.18) 5.39 (.99) 5.96 (.83) 6.08 (1.21) 6.10 (1.17) 5.67 (1.44) 5.87 (1.31) 5.71 (1.12) 6.12 (1.05)
Pollution 5.49 (1.50) 5.53 (1.38) 4.74 (1.71) 5.00 (1.71) 5.55 (1.44) 5.71 (1.25) 5.58 (1.49) 5.55 (1.36) 5.68 (1.44) 5.24 (1.52)
Natural variation 4.28 (1.74) 4.47 (1.60) 4.48 (1.65) 5.00 (1.73) 4.06 (1.70) 4.11 (1.53) 4.16 (1.74) 4.52 (1.65) 5.11 (1.81) 5.41 (.94)
Immediate impacts 4.22 (1.70) 4.05 (1.59) 3.48 (1.59) 4.35 (1.85) 4.42 (1.63) 4.16 (1.49) 4.16 (1.80) 3.76 (1.60) 4.21 (1.75) 4.24 (1.68)
Delayed impacts 4.56† (1.80) 4.90† (1.65) 4.00 (1.76) 4.22 (1.93) 4.85 (1.69) 5.06 (1.53) 4.55 (1.90) 4.85 (1.64) 4.07 (1.86) 5.18 (1.85)
N 204 196 23 23 98 89 55 67 28 17
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.
CC = climate change; GW = global warming.
†p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01 (with Bonferroni correction).
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In this vein, the present work sought to illuminate the cognitions that “global
warming” and “climate change” evoke among political partisans in the USA.
Although past research suggests that a global warming frame may activate stronger
thoughts related to temperature increases (e.g., melting polar ice caps) and human
causality (e.g., fossil fuel pollution) among the public at large (Whitmarsh, 2009), we
tested whether these associations might be especially pronounced among conserva-
tives and Republicans in the USA, who have long espoused greater uncertainty about
the phenomenon’s existence and its human causes (McCright & Dunlap, 2000, 2011)
and who have recently been shown to express less certainty about the existence of
“global warming” than of “climate change” (Schuldt et al., 2011). Specifically, when
we asked partisans to report the extent to which they associated various concepts with
“global warming” or “climate change,” the responses of conservatives and Repub-
licans (but not of liberals or Democrats) suggested greater accessibility of heat-related
thoughts (i.e., rising temperatures and melting polar ice) in response to “global
warming” in particular. We found no effect of wording on thoughts related to human
causality. In addition, our findings revealed a marginally significant effect whereby
“global warming” was more strongly associated with delayed impacts than was
“climate change” in the sample overall. While scholars have pointed out that the
distal construal of climate-related consequences may leave individuals unmotivated to
engage in climate-mitigating actions (Gilbert, 2006; Weber, 2006; Weber & Stern,
2011), the present results hint that the “global warming” frame, in particular, might
promote this unhelpful tendency. Thus, the current results extend the growing
literature in environmental communication on the effects of various labels or frames
for global climate change on public perceptions (e.g., Akerlof & Maibach, 2011;
Jaskulskya & Besela, 2013; Maibach et al., 2010; Schuldt et al., 2011) and highlight the
importance of accounting for relevant individual differences (here, political orienta-
tion) in such analyses.
Beyond its specific relevance to the case of “global warming”/“climate change”
framing, this work also highlights the importance and power of framing in
environmental communication more broadly. As Lakoff (2010) has written, these
frames are likely to affect how the public perceives the climate issue and to influence
their environmental policy preferences, something that astute political strategists
seem keenly aware of (e.g., Luntz, 2003). In this vein, future work in environmental
communication may fruitfully explore how the individual’s frame of mind is shaped
by the myriad other environment-related frames that are commonly employed in the
media (e.g., global climate change as “climate crisis,” a threat to “biodiversity,” “the
economy,” etc.) and that may similarly interact with the individual’s values and goals.
More generally, the present work highlights an often-overlooked conceptual
distinction between framing effects (which typically describe cases in which
alternative media frames lead to different preferences among an audience) and
audience frames (the frames in thought that presumably mediate framing effects). By
more directly measuring the thoughts evoked by specific frames and messages (Price
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et al., 1997; Shapiro, 1994), researchers may better understand the cognitive processes
that give rise to the downstream effects that media frames exert on audiences.
We note that this study has some limitations. Our convenience sample of political
partisans in the USA provided a useful testing ground for exploring whether cognitive
responses to “global warming” versus “climate change” would differ across liberals
and conservatives. However, the fact that this sample was not representative of
the American public may limit the generalizability of the present findings for US
public discourse on global climate change. On the other hand, we believe that the
experimental (rather than descriptive) nature of the study mitigates this concern.
Second, in contrast to previous work employing open-ended or free-response
measures of cognitive associations (e.g., Leiserowitz, 2006; Price et al., 1997;
Whitmarsh, 2009), we chose to employ closed-ended rating scale measures. While
these rating scale measures offered us a number of advantages, notably allowing us to
focus on a limited set of cognitive associations suggested by previous work, they
carried disadvantages as well, such as possibly constraining spontaneous concept
accessibility, failing to capture other (unsolicited) cognitive associations, and so on
(Geer, 1991). Related to this, the more explicit nature of these rating scale measures
may strike some as more demand-laden than open-ended measures. We would note,
however, that it is unlikely that participants became aware of our research questions,
which centered on interactions between frames and individual difference variables, as
opposed to main effects.5 Third, our focus on the US political context may invite
questions about the implications of these findings for other contexts. Although this
work may generalize most readily to other English-speaking nations where climate
beliefs have become politically divisive (e.g., the UK; e.g., Nerlich & Jaspal, 2012), it
may nevertheless inform our understanding of how the public thinks about these
phrases more broadly (including contexts in which climate beliefs are less politicized),
given that English has emerged as the de facto international language of science
(Ammon, 2001) and that common heat-related associations regarding global climate
change (e.g. threatened polar bears and melting polar ice) may reduce the sense of
urgency among the public to confront this challenging issue. We would also note that
although the kind of framing examined here—which involves the use of different
labels that reference a single issue—can be considered emphasis framing in the sense
of selectively directing attention toward (and away from) certain subsets of issue-
relevant information (Druckman, 2001a), such frames are sufficiently different from
the kind that attempt to situate global climate change and its consequences within
broader sociocultural contexts (e.g., as an “environmental” vs. “public health” issue;
Maibach et al., 2010) that it may be served by somewhat distinct cognitive processes.6
Future theorizing and research should attempt to distinguish these types and
illuminate their underlying mechanisms.
Finally, it is important to note that the ways that citizens think about global
warming and climate change are not likely static, but rather, highly situated and
determined by a complicated interplay of prevailing conditions, from everyday
weather experiences (e.g. Joireman, Truelove, & Duell, 2010) to news coverage (e.g.,
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of Al Gore’s film An Inconvenient Truth and “Climategate”; Leiserowitz, Maibach,
Roser-Renouf, Smith, & Dawson, 2012; Nolan, 2010) and the political climate in
Washington, D.C. (Elsasser & Dunlap, 2012; Oreskes & Conway, 2010). Thus, the
present findings should be understood within this shifting public opinion landscape,
while explicitly recognizing that these cognitive associations may change over time
and across contexts, just as public opinion and affective images associated with global
warming have been known to do (Krosnick et al., 2000; McCright & Dunlap, 2011;
Smith & Leiserowitz, 2012).
Overall, the present findings suggest that although they are often used inter-
changeably in the media and in public discourse about global climate change, “global
warming” and “climate change” may be perceived quite differently by political groups
that typically disagree about climate issues. Whereas the present work is a first attempt
to measure the concepts that these frames evoke in partisan minds, future research
may explore whether a similar pattern emerges among nationally representative
samples, as well as the potential consequences of these different associations for
citizens’ reported beliefs, attitudes, and policy preferences surrounding climate issues.
Notes
1. A Lexis-Nexis search for these phrases among the headlines of seventeen major US newspapers
representing diverse political perspectives (e.g., The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal)
during the period from 2007 to 2012 (following the release of Al Gore’s film An Inconvenient
Truth) revealed that both phrases appear frequently in the media, with “global warming”
returning over 500 instances and “climate change” returning over 700.
2. According to the US Environmental Protection Agency, “global warming” refers to the increase
in global surface temperatures resulting from anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, whereas
“climate change” refers to various protracted changes in climate patterns more broadly
(Environmental Protection Agency [EPA], 2012).
3. Numbers represent the percentage endorsing a value ≥5 on the belief scale.
4. Political ideology was distributed as: “very liberal” (15.6%), “liberal” (31.0%), “basically
independent, but leaning toward liberal” (19.5%), “independent” (16.3%), “basically independ-
ent, but leaning toward conservative” (7.8%), “conservative” (8.0%), “very conservative” (1.8%).
Political party affiliation was distributed as: “Democrat” (46.8%), “Republican” (11.5%),
“Independent” (30.5%), “Other/None of the above” (11.3%).
5. Indeed, when we asked participants before debriefing to guess what the study was “really about,”
none indicated any awareness of our research questions.
6. For example, compared to attempts at framing a given issue (e.g., gun ownership) in different
sociocultural terms (as an “individual rights” vs. “public safety” issue), the type of framing
examined here involves varying only a few words that are commonly treated as synonyms. As a
result, we speculate that such framing may rely primarily on the activation of semantically
related concepts stored in memory (e.g., “heat” in the case of “global warming”; Bargh et al.,
1996; Collins & Loftus, 1975). Because the wording change is quite subtle, this framing may also
invite less explicit awareness on the part of audiences and trigger less counter-argumentation,
mental correction, and other types of controlled message processing (Sniderman & Theriault,
2004; Wilson & Brekke, 1994).
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